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From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda
CHRISTOPHER BLATTMAN Yale University
What is the political legacy of violent conflict? I present evidence for a link from past violenceto increased political engagement among excombatants. The evidence comes from northernUganda, where rebel recruitment generated quasiexperimental variation in who was conscripted
by abduction. Survey data suggest that abduction leads to substantial increases in voting and community
leadership, largely due to elevated levels of violence witnessed. Meanwhile, abduction and violence do
not appear to affect nonpolitical participation. These patterns are not easily explained by conventional
theories of participation, including mobilization by elites, differential costs, and altruistic preferences.
Qualitative interviews suggest that violence may lead to personal growth and political activation, a
possibility supported by psychological research on the positive effects of traumatic events. Although the
generalizability of these results requires more evidence to judge, the findings challenge our understanding
of political behavior and point to important new avenues of research.
What is the political legacy of a violent civilwar? Can perpetrators and victims becomeproductive citizens once the fighting stops?
Policy makers are pessimistic. A recent World Bank
report sees the individual impacts of civil war as so
adverse that they lead to social disintegration (Collier
et al. 2003). The French foreign minister recently spoke
of young exsoldiers as “a time bomb that threatens
stability and growth” (BBC 2007). A New York Times
editorial lamented that such youth return as “dam-
aged, uneducated pariahs” (Editorial, 2006). Mean-
while, reintegration experts worry that excombatants
face a life of crime and banditry, and remain alienated
and “at war” in their own minds (Richards et al. 2003;
Spear 2006). If these commentators are correct, then
the rebuilding of society may be all the more challeng-
ing and unlikely after war, and could contribute to the
well-known “conflict trap” (Collier 2007).
Not all evidence is so gloomy. Psychologists con-
sistently find that victims of violence are in general
resilient, and a growing psychological literature finds
that experiences of personal growth are more com-
mon than distress in the aftermath of violent trauma
(Tedeschi and Calhoun 2004). A handful of studies also
tie victimization by war violence to greater collective
action. Wood (2003), for instance, argues that govern-
ment violence in El Salvador prompted its victims to
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support and even join opposition forces out of moral
outrage, whereas Bellows and Miguel (2006, 2008) find
that displacement and family deaths from war lead to
greater political participation and awareness in Sierra
Leonean households.
Little of this evidence, however, proves a causal link
from violence to political engagement, and even less
concerns the perpetrators. Yet, violence is endemic in
the developing world; civil conflict has afflicted more
than half of all nations since 1945, with one-fifth suf-
fering ten or more years of war (Blattman and Miguel
N.d.). In the burgeoning conflict literature, however,
the impact of voting on violence receives more atten-
tion than the reverse (Snyder 2000; Wilkinson 2004).
I employ new data and a tragic natural experiment
in northern Uganda to quantify the sociopolitical im-
pacts of combat experiences and war violence. Patterns
of rebel abduction during Uganda’s twenty-year war
appear to have generated nearly exogenous variation
in recruitment. If so, causal estimates of its impact on
later-life outcomes such as political participation can
be identified.
The results defy expectations and suggest that
forced recruitment leads to greater postwar political
participation—a 27% increase in the likelihood of vot-
ing and a doubling of the likelihood of being a com-
munity leader among former abductees. Abduction,
however, does not generally affect nonpolitical forms
of social activity, suggesting that the effects of war on
participation may be uniquely political.1
Of course, conscription simply represents a package
of war experiences: violence, military training, indoc-
trination, time away, and so forth. Analysis of self-
reported experiences suggests that exposure to vio-
lence, in particular, violence witnessed, accounts for
most of the impact of abduction on participation. No
other war experiences have similar explanatory power.
This finding is good news for policy makers in
wartorn nations. For social scientists, however, it
presents a puzzle: why would violence lead to positive
1 Blattman and Annan (2008) use the same data and empirical strat-
egy to assess the long-term economic and psychosocial impacts of
abduction.
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political engagement? I argue that conventional
explanations—ones that focus on the costs of voting,
or elite mobilization—find little support in the data.
Personal interviews with local leaders and former com-
batants, however, reveal narratives of personal trans-
formation that echo a psychological literature on in-
dividual growth and activation after trauma (Tedeschi
and Calhoun 2004). I explore the alternative empirical
and theoretical links between violence and voting and
set out an agenda for research in political behavior and
psychology.
WAR, ABDUCTION, AND POLITICS
IN NORTHERN UGANDA
In 1988, a spirit medium named Joseph Kony assem-
bled the remnants of several failed insurgent groups
from northern Uganda into a new force, the Lord’s
Resistance Army, or LRA.2 Locally, Kony is believed
to possess great spiritual powers, and his stated goal
is to seek a spiritual cleansing of the nation. Kony’s
movement, however, is also rooted in a long-standing
political, economic, and ethnic divide. Following in-
dependence, northern peoples (including the Acholi,
to which Kony and the LRA belong) dominated the
military, whereas southerners dominated the commer-
cial sector. For more than two decades, this martial
power enabled a series of brutal northern dictators to
govern the nation. In 1986, however, a young politician
named Yoweri Museveni led a southern rebel force to
overthrow the Acholi-dominated government. Several
guerrilla forces in the north initially resisted Musev-
eni’s takeover, but for the most part settled for peace
or were defeated by 1988. The handful of fighters that
would not settle for peace gathered under Kony to
continue the fight.
Despite widespread antipathy for Museveni, the
LRA attracted limited support from other Acholi, and
the poverty and unpopularity of the movement led to
nearly complete reliance on forced recruitment. From
its earliest days, the rebels looted homes and abducted
youth to obtain supplies and recruits. In 1994, the
Sudanese government began supplying the LRA with
supplies, weapons, and territory on which to build
bases—support that enlarged and invigorated a small
and weak LRA. Abduction from 1995 to 2004 was
large scale and indiscriminate, with 60,000 to 80,000
youth estimated to have been taken by the LRA for
at least a day (Annan, Blattman, and Horton 2006;
Pham, Vinck, and Stover 2007). The majority were
adolescent males, although men and women of all ages
were commonly taken.
Twenty percent of male abductees did not return
and, sadly, can be presumed perished (as few remain
with the LRA). The remaining 80% escaped, were
released, or were rescued after periods of 1 day to
ten years. Roughly half of these “returnees” were de-
mobilized by the Ugandan army (the UPDF), and two
2 This account is based on Allen (2005), Beber and Blattman (2008),
Behrend (1999), Doom and Vlassenroot (1999), Finnström (2008b),
Lamwaka (2002), and Omara-Otunnu (1994).
in five returnees passed through a “reception center”
that provided basic health services, family relocation,
and reinsertion. In 2006, the Government of Uganda
and the LRA reached a fragile truce. Peace talks broke
down in 2008.
The two decades of instability and economic destruc-
tion in the north stand in stark contrast to the success
and stability of the rest of Uganda. Outside Acholiland,
violence has abated, infrastructure has expanded, HIV
infection rates have fallen, and economic growth has
been a robust 6% for the past decade (Government of
Uganda 2007).
DATA AND MEASUREMENT
To assess the effects of combat and war violence on par-
ticipation, this article compares the social and political
participation of (exogenously) abducted and nonab-
ducted youth in northern Uganda, as well as by spe-
cific war experiences within each group. Quantitative
data come from Phase I of the Survey of War Affected
Youth (SWAY), a representative survey of male youth
(ages 14–30) in eight rural subcounties of the districts of
Kitgum and Pader. Data were collected in 2005–06 by
the author, a psychologist, and local research assistants.
To account for migration and mortality, the survey
selected respondents from a sample frame of youth
living in the region before the conflict. A total of
1,162 households were sampled from World Food Pro-
gramme lists compiled in 2002, and 93% of house-
hold heads were located and interviewed. Enumerators
worked with household heads to develop a roster of all
youth living in the household in 1996—a year chosen
because it was easily recalled as the date of the first
election since 1980.
A sample of 881 surviving male youth was drawn
from these retrospective rosters. Nearly half of the
youth had moved since 1996 and were tracked across
the region. Surveyors located 741, or 84%. Former ab-
ductees were oversampled, with 462 interviewed in to-
tal. Absentee questionnaires were conducted with the
families of young men that had died or were not found
to correct for observable determinants of attrition.3
Survey summary statistics are listed in Table 1.
Measuring Participation
The survey includes three indicators of political par-
ticipation. First, two weeks prior to the survey a na-
tional referendum was held on the question of opening
Uganda to multiparty politics.4 Forty-six percent of
survey respondents older than age 18 say they Voted
3 There are two types of unfound youth: absentees that could not
be tracked down, and those that did not return from abduction.
Enumerators interviewed the families of all but about 11 absentees,
and virtually all were reported to be engaged in work or school. Those
that did not return from abduction comprise 20% of all abductees,
95% of which can be presumed perished given the small number of
abductees still with the armed group.
4 This referendum asked voters: “Do you agree to open up the
political space to allow those who wish to join different organiza-
tions/parties to do so to compete for political power?”
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TABLE 1. Summary Statistics
All Youth Abducted Only Nonabd Only
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Obs
War Experiences
Months abducted (total) 9.3 [16.2] 741
Age abducted 15.3 [4.7] 462
Violent acts total (of 25) 7.9 [4.7] 11.0 [4.6] 5.2 [2.9] 737
Violent acts witnessed (of 6) 3.0 [1.7] 3.9 [1.5] 2.2 [1.5] 739
Violent acts on family (of 5) 2.1 [1.4] 2.2 [1.4] 2.0 [1.4] 739
Violent acts received (of 6) 2.1 [1.8] 3.3 [1.6] 1.0 [1.2] 739
Violent acts perpetrated (of 9) .7 [1.4] 1.5 [1.8] .1 [.3] 738
Leadership position (indicator) .09 [.29] 462
Carried own firearm (indicator) .32 [.47] 462
Passed through reception center .39 [.49] 462
Received NGO services .22 [.42] 462
Sociopolitical Indicators
Voted in 2005 (if 18 or older) .46 [.50] .51 [.50] .40 [.49] 533
Community mobilizer .051 [.22] .072 [.26] .032 [.18] 741
Political employment .007 [.08] .011 [.11] .003 [.06] 741
Any community group member .42 [.49] .43 [.50] .41 [.49] 741
Peace group member .06 [.24] .07 [.26] .05 [.21] 741
Water committee member .016 [.12] .009 [.10] .021 [.14] 741
Cultural group member .16 [.36] .17 [.37] .15 [.36] 741
Sporting group or team member .11 [.31] .08 [.27] .13 [.33] 741
Farmer’s cooperative member .11 [.31] .11 [.32] .10 [.31] 741
School club/committee member .06 [.23] .06 [.24] .05 [.22] 741
Church or bible group member .18 [.38] .17 [.38] .18 [.38] 741
Attends church .78 [.41] .77 [.42] .79 [.41] 741
Volunteer .05 [.21] .06 [.23] .04 [.20] 741
Disobeys elders .07 [.25] .08 [.27] .06 [.23] 741
Bottom quartile of prosocial
distribution
.23 [.42] .18 [.38] .27 [.44] 741
Physical fight .07 [.25] .07 [.25] .07 [.25] 741
Ever quarrelsome .05 [.21] .03 [.17] .06 [.24] 741
Ever threatens to hurt others .02 [.14] .03 [.17] .01 [.11] 741
Note: Sample means weighted by inverse sampling and inverse attrition probabilities.
in the 2005 referendum, a rate comparable to national
turnout levels. Second, 5% of youth report that they
are a Community mobilizer—elected members of the
community who are responsible for organizing the
community for daily or weekly meetings.5 Finally, four
respondents (.4%) hold a Political job, such as a village
councilperson.
The survey also sought indicators of community
participation. Forty-two percent report Membership
in any community group, including peace groups
(6%), water management committees (1.6%), cultural
groups (16%), sports teams (11%), farmer’s coopera-
tives (11%), school clubs and committees (6%), and
church or bible study groups (18%). Seventy-eight per-
cent also Attend church regularly, and 5% of youth
Volunteer for a community organization.
Last, the survey measured self-reported prosocial
and aggressive behaviors. Acholi culture stresses obe-
5 The mobilizer is the most common form of youth leadership and is
an unpaid community service. Every few years, communities hold a
meeting and solicit nominations. Nominees give a short speech and
are elected by a show of hands.
dience to elders, and 7% indicated that they Disobey el-
ders. The survey also measured 11 self-reported proso-
cial behaviors (e.g., enjoying working with peers, or
being helpful to the community), and we construct an
indicator for those in the Bottom quartile of the proso-
cial distribution.6 Finally, the survey asked whether
respondents had been in a Physical fight in the past
six months (7%), whether they were Ever quarrelsome
(5%), and whether they Ever threatened to hurt others
(2%).
Measuring War Experiences
More than two in five male youth reported an Ab-
duction of any length. Many of these abductions were
short, especially among abductees younger than 11 or
older than 20. Such youth were often released after
giving directions or carrying loot (Beber and Blattman
6 The psychosocial survey questions are based on an adapted version
of the Northern Ugandan Child and Youth Psychosocial Adjustment
Scale (Loughry and MacMullin 2002)
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2008). Months Abducted ranged from 1 day to 10 years,
averaging 9.3 months for a youth’s longest abduction.
The LRA routinely used violence to intimidate and
control civilians and abductees. To gauge respondents’
levels of exposure to violence, the survey asked about
25 of the most common Violent acts experienced, in-
cluding 6 acts witnessed, 6 received, 8 perpetrated by
the respondent, and 5 inflicted on family members of
the respondent by the LRA.7 The average abductee
reported 11 different violent acts versus nonabductees’
5.2 acts. Most youth, for example, witnessed killings, ex-
perienced their homes being raided, or took cover from
gunfire. Among the abducted, forced labor, thrashings,
and imprisonment were commonplace. Attempts to es-
cape were punished with beatings or death, a sentence
other abductees were often forced to carry out with
machetes or clubs. Initiation to the LRA also involved
forced violence: 25% of abductees were made to harm
or kill a civilian, and 23% were made to desecrate
dead bodies—a deeply held taboo. Finally, 13.5% of
abductees report being forced to beat or kill family or
friends. Such violence served to break down a youth’s
defenses, desensitize him to violence, and dissuade him
from escape (Beber and Blattman 2008).
Other war experiences recorded include indicators
for whether the youth held a Leadership position or
rank (9%), ever Carried his own firearm (32%), and
whether he Passed through a reception center (39%).
Such centers were set up by local and international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) after 1999 to
receive youth returning from long abductions. Just 22%
of abductees Received services from NGOs after re-
turning home.
Qualitative Data
Following the survey and preliminary quantitative
analysis, in 2007, I conducted semistructured interviews
to explore the meaning and validity of the sociopoliti-
cal survey results. Interviews were conducted in three
of the eight enumeration areas and included all sur-
vey respondents recorded as community mobilizers or
having political jobs, all former abductees holding any
rank, as well as a random sample of 20 respondents
(half of whom voted in the 2005 referendum and half
of whom did not). Interviews began with a repeat of
the abduction and sociopolitical modules of the ques-
tionnaire, whereupon respondents were asked to elab-
orate on their closed-ended answers to explore key
themes, including reasons for voting/not voting, the his-
tory of group participation and community leadership,
7 The survey recorded an indicator for ever experiencing each act,
and each index is a sum of these indicators. Acts received include
gunfire, forced labor, beatings, armed attacked, being tied up, and
receiving a war. Acts witnessed include regular gunfire, beatings or
torture, attacks or battles, killings, massacres, rape, and the torch-
ing of occupied homes. Acts perpetrated include beating a civilian,
beating family or friends, killing a soldier, killing a civilian, killing
family or friends, forcible sex, and abuse of dead bodies. Violence
on family includes abducted parent, other abducted family, family
member with war injury, violent death of a parent, and violent death
of other family.
and reasons for/for not becoming a particular group
member or community leader.8
Also interviewed in a less structured fashion were
five reception center workers, six local political opera-
tives, and two poll workers from the same three enu-
meration areas. These interviews focused on the role
of formerly abducted youth in local politics (without
revealing the positive association between abduction
and participation).
Furthermore, prior to the survey in 2005, I conducted
two months of unstructured interviews with approxi-
mately 120 youth (including 80 abductees), plus more
than 60 community members and leaders. The inter-
views focused on abduction patterns, LRA organiza-
tion, and return and reintegration experiences. Inter-
views aimed to understand the conduct of the war,
investigate the validity of the causal identification strat-
egy, and develop reintegration metrics and hypotheses.
Interview subjects were typically contacted through
community leaders and reception center staff. fifteen
former LRA junior officers (e.g., a lieutenant) were
also purposefully located via these channels.
Finally, concurrent with the survey, a psycholo-
gist and a local social worker conducted system-
atic, semistructured interviews and psychosocial as-
sessments of a nonrandom subsample of 30 youth and
their families. The details of this qualitative psychoso-
cial study are reported in Annan, Brier, and Aryemo
(2008), and relevant results are highlighted in this
article.
THE IMPACT OF ABDUCTION
ON PARTICIPATION
Empirical Strategy
Estimating the impacts of military service and war vio-
lence is a difficult task. Combatants are usually unlike
noncombatants in unobservable ways, and so any com-
parison will conflate the impacts of war with preexisting
differences that led the youth to join or be selected by
the armed group. This is especially true if the character-
istics associated with being a combatant (e.g., poverty,
social exclusion, or malleability) are traits that also
affect social consciousness or political activity.
One solution is the counterfactual approach, where
a relevant control group is found for recruits. The
estimated impact, however, is only as reliable as the
counterfactual. Causal estimates will be unbiased only
when recruitment is “conditionally unconfounded” or
exogenous—that is, when all selection is on observed
traits (Imbens 2004; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983;
Rubin 1978).
8 Questionnaires are available at www.sway-uganda.org or by re-
quest. Relevant modules include Sections VII (Community Involve-
ment & Political Attitudes) and IX (Abduction and Return Experi-
ences). The interview was predicated as a follow-up of survey quality
and responses, typically with the original enumerator present. Addi-
tional topics explored included war and abduction experiences, voter
registration status, the qualities of good leaders, election processes,
and the role of former abductees in the community and community
politics.
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In most wars, such stringent conditions would not
hold. Evidence from Uganda, however, suggests that
the most common types of selection into armed groups
are not present in the case of the LRA. First, volunteer-
ing (or self-selection) into the LRA was virtually un-
known. What few volunteers did exist tended to join be-
fore 1991, and most come from a neighboring district,
Gulu (and so do not influence this article’s sample).
Second, interviews with the leaders of LRA raiding
parties suggest that by neither design nor accident
did they abduct a select group of youth. From their
Sudanese bases, rebels ventured into Uganda for
weeks at a time in groups of roughly 15 fighters.
Raiding parties had two aims: ambushing government
forces and raiding homesteads along their path for
food and recruits. Abduction targets tended to be
unplanned and arbitrary, and homesteads were raided
regardless of wealth or makeup. Typical of East Africa,
rural Acholi households live in relatively isolated
homesteads in their fields, arrangements that made
them particularly vulnerable to LRA raids. Rebels
usually invaded such homesteads at night, abducting
all able-bodied people to carry looted goods. These
abduction parties were under instruction to release
only young children and older adults, but to keep all
adolescent and young adult males.
The data support these claims. The survey gath-
ered data on prewar household wealth (including land
and livestock) and parent’s education, occupation, and
death—traits that are believed to be reliable predictors
of participation in armed groups in Africa (e.g., Cohn
and Goodwin-Gill 1994; Honwana 2005; Humphreys
and Weinstein 2008). If we compare the abducted and
nonabducted along such prewar traits, we observe little
difference in conditional mean differences at even the
10% significance level (Table 2, Column 1). Abducted
youth differ only by year of birth (as expected) and
prewar household size.9
These same household traits, however, help predict
participation in a voluntary government militia, imply-
ing that if abduction were associated with these prewar
traits we would have the statistical power to observe it.
Five percent of youth were current or past militia mem-
bers. A comparison of prewar traits shows that mili-
tia members came from poorer and more agricultural
households (Table 2, Column 2), and collectively, the
prewar covariates strongly predict government militia
membership—the effects are larger than in the abduc-
tion case and jointly significant at the 5% level.
A remaining concern is selective attrition. There
are two main types of “attritors”: nonsurvivors and
unfound migrants. The 84% tracking success rate
meets or exceeds the rates achieved by several “gold-
standard” youth tracking surveys in poor countries
9 The significance is driven by households greater than 25 in number,
perhaps because small bands of raiders were hesitant to raid large,
difficult-to-control groups. Otherwise, differences in the distribu-
tions of predicted abduction probabilities among abducted and non-
abducted youth are driven by year and location of birth alone. In a
logit regression of abduction on prewar traits, omission of household
traits does not affect the distribution of the predicted probabilities,
and they are jointly not significance (p = .18).
(Hamory and Miguel 2006; Thomas, Frankenberg, and
Smith 2001). Also, similar proportions of abducted and
nonabducted youth were found (29.7% vs. 28.3%).
Even so, differential attrition patterns raise concern:
nonabducted youth are more like to have migrated
and gone unfound, whereas abductees are uniquely
likely to have been abducted and not returned (and
can be assumed perished given the small number of
abductees still with the LRA). Estimates of the impact
of abduction will be biased if qualities that determine
migration or survival also shape political action.
To correct for attrition on observables, we collected
demographic data and data on current activities and
well-being from the surviving family members. Follow-
ing Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt (1998), these
data were used to calculate attrition probabilities, and
regression estimates are weighted by the inverse of
these attrition probabilities to eliminate bias from at-
trition on observed traits.
Results
Assuming conditional unconfoundedness, consistent
estimates of the causal impact of abduction can be cal-
culated using an index model such as a logit, weighted
by a nonparametric estimate of the selection probabil-
ity, or propensity score (Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder
2003).10 The results are displayed in Table 3.
To begin, abduction leads to an 11.0 percentage point
increase in the probability a youth older than 18 voted
in the 2005 referendum (Column 2), significant at the
1% level. Because just 40% of eligible nonabducted
youth voted (Column 1), this ATE represents a 27%
increase in voter turnout (Column 3).
Abduction also leads to a 3.4 percentage point in-
crease in the likelihood that a youth is a community
mobilizer, significant at the 1% level. Just 3% of non-
abducted youth are leaders, and so the impact of abduc-
tion represents a 106% increase in levels of leadership.
Abduction is also associated with a 190% increase in
the likelihood of holding a political job such as a com-
munity council member or appointee. The estimate,
however, is not statistically significant due to sample
size: only four respondents reported such employment,
three of whom are former abductees. But the direction
and magnitude of the result is consistent with the other
political results.
10 In this case, Y∗ is a latent variable describing an individual i’s
propensity for participation, observed as a binary outcome, Y. The
treatment effect, τ, can be estimated by the following regression:
P(Yi = 1) = (τ · Ti + XSi · β1),
where the treatment (i.e., abduction) indicator T equals 1 if
youth i was abducted, and the XS are the subset of observed
covariates X that are significantly correlated with Y, conditional on
treatment. The weights used are




+ 1 − Ti1 − ê(vi)
)
,
where ρi and πi are sampling and attrition weights, and ê(vi) is
a nonparametric estimate of the propensity score. The vi are the
subset of the covariates Xi that have substantial correlation with the
treatment.
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TABLE 2. Determinants of LRA Abduction and Recruitment into
Government Militias
(1) (2)






Year of birth† 1.27 2.31
[.51]∗∗ [.65]∗∗∗
Indicator for father a farmer† −.01 .05
[.02] [.04]
Household size in 1996† −1.51 1.32
[.32]∗∗∗ [.54]∗∗
Landholdings in 1996† −1.46 −7.12
[2.72] [4.28]
Indicator for top 10% of landholdings† −.02 −.12
[.03] [.05]∗∗
Cattle in 1996† 6.21 −4.51
[4.98] [3.51]
Other livestock in 1996† 2.07 −1.94
[1.66] [2.38]
Indicator for plow ownership in 1996† −.01 −.06
[.04] [.04]
Indicator for uneducated father .02 −.12
[.02] [.04]∗∗∗
Father’s years of schooling −.06 .41
[.30] [.43]
Indicator for uneducated mother −.01 .05
[.04] [.10]
Mother’s years of schooling −.12 −.14
[.34] [.65]
Indicator for paternal death before 1996 .03 .05
[.05] [.11]
Indicator for maternal death before 1996 .02 −.03
[.02] [.03]
Indicator for orphaning before 1996 −.02 −.01
[.02] [.02]
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by location.
All estimates weighted by inverse sampling probabilities and inverse attrition probabilities.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
†Mean differences include data from unfound and nonsurviving youth, and omit inverse attrition
weights.
‡The unconditional difference is a simple difference in means, whereas the conditional difference is
the coefficient on abduction from a weighted least squares regression of the covariate on abduction
and all other pretreatment covariates.
Turning to others forms of community participation,
the causal impacts of abduction on various forms of
group membership are either small or not statistically
significant. Participation in a sporting organization is
lower among abductees, although the result is only sig-
nificant at the 10% level. Only in one instance, peace
groups, is there a significant impact of abduction. Peace
groups are clubs of youth that stage cultural dances,
dramatic presentations, debates, and talks, often with
peace-building or reconciliation themes, and abducted
youth are nearly twice as likely to be members
(92%).
Finally, there is little evidence of heightened asocial
or aggressive behavior among abductees. Abductees
are slightly less likely to report that they engaged in a
fight or exhibit antisocial behavior, but are more likely
to report that they disobey elders, threaten others, or
are quarrelsome. None of these results are statistically
significant. One risk, of course, is that hostile atti-
tudes and behaviors are systematically underreported,
thus increasing standard errors and biasing coefficients
downward (especially if measurement error is higher
among abductees). Nonetheless, even underreporting
of a grand magnitude—such as two in three youth fail-
ing to report aggressiveness—would still imply that ag-
gression is small in absolute terms.
All estimates are robust to alternative specifications,
including the removal of the control variables, the
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of Abduction† % Change
Voted in 2005 .40 .110 27%
[.036]∗∗∗
Community mobilizer .03 .034 106%
[.012]∗∗∗
Political employment .003 .006 190%
[.005]
Any community group member .41 −.007 −2%
[.045]
Peace group member .05 .043 92%
[.020]∗∗
Water committee member .02 −.009 −43%
[.011]
Cultural group member .15 −.021 −14%
[.049]
Sporting group/team member .13 −.060 −44%
[.033]∗
Farmer’s cooperative member .10 .002 2%
[.015]
School club/committee member .05 .024 49%
[.022]
Church or bible study group member .18 .032 18%
[.049]
Attends church .79 −.014 −2%
[.041]
Volunteer .04 .004 10%
[.015]
Disobeys elders .06 .035 63%
[.023]
Bottom quartile of prosocial distribution .27 −.075 −28%
[.046]
Physical fight .07 −.024 −35%
[.021]
Ever quarrelsome .06 .005 8%
[.008]
Ever threatens to hurt others .01 .019 168%
[.012]
Notes: Each item in Column 2 is the product of a separate regression.
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by sampling location.
†Calculated as the coefficient on an abduction dummy variable in a weighted probit regression of the
dependent variable on the abduction dummy, age (including the square and cube), location dummy variables,
and prewar household traits. The regression is weighted on inverse selection, sampling, and attrition
probabilities.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
nonparametric selection weights, and the attrition cor-
rection (results not displayed).
Discussion
First and foremost, the popular picture of for-
mer combatants—damaged, alienated, and potentially
violent—finds little support in these data. Rather, for-
mer abductees are just as likely to belong to social
groups as the nonabducted and just as unlikely to re-
port antisocial behaviors.
Several qualitative studies echo these results. For
instance, a psychosocial study of northern Ugandan
youth by Annan, Brier, and Aryemo (2008) finds that
abductees commonly reported problems with family
or community immediately on return, but that such
reintegration problems diminished rapidly with time.
Families and communities were generally welcoming,
and more than 95% of the abducted youth in the
sample returned home. In their studies of Acholi cos-
mology and reconciliation processes, Baines (2005)
and Harlacher et al. (2006) argue that such reintegra-
tion was facilitated by a cultural ethos of reconcilia-
tion and a public campaign for forgiveness and accep-
tance by public officials, religious leaders, and NGOs.
Similarly high rates of community reconciliation and
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acceptance have also been reported in countries
such as Sierra Leone (e.g., Wessells 2006; Williamson
2006).
Most surprising, the analysis suggests that abduction
leads to a substantial increase in levels of political en-
gagement. The survey’s measures of political participa-
tion are admittedly limited in scope, confined to voting,
community leadership, and political jobs, and hence,
some caution is warranted. In each case, however, the
impacts of abduction on political participation are rela-
tively large. The increase in voting among abductees is
comparable to the average effect of compulsory voting
laws in a sample of 324 international elections (Blais
and Dobrzynska 1998). Abduction’s impact is also or-
ders of magnitude greater than the average impacts
of canvasing and other turnout efforts in U.S. elections
(Gerber and Green 2000; Green and Gerber 2004). Un-
fortunately, comparable African benchmarks do not
exist.
The evidence also suggests that abductees’ com-
munity engagement is generally positive and civic in
nature. Community mobilization is a productive role
in the village, undertaken by the most confident and
public-minded youth. Voting in the 2005 referendum
was peaceful overall, and the measure received broad
support, with 92% of national voters supporting the
measure (IFES 2007). The survey did not track politi-
cally contentious outcomes, however, and so we cannot
exclude the possibility that abductees are also more
politically contentious or polarized.
We do observe some evidence of elevated aggres-
sion in abductees in the form of threats (although
not in reports of fighting or asocial behavior). Self-
reported threats are not significantly correlated with
voting and community mobilization, however, suggest-
ing the more aggressive youth are not the same as
those that are politically active. The incidence of such
hostility is also very small in absolute terms. Indeed,
psychosocial studies in Uganda have emphasized the
contrary: abducted youth tend to respond passively in
response to harassment or aggression in order to avoid
stigma, signal their peacefulness to the wider commu-
nity, avoid painful memories of the war, and, in some
cases, for fear of their own potential for aggression
(Annan, Brier, and Aryemo 2008; Veale and Stavrou
2007).
The remainder of the article explores possible ra-
tionales for the relationship between abduction and
political participation. Before doing so, however, it is
worth asking whether the impacts we observe could
be spurious—the result of unobserved selection ef-
fects rather than changes in behavior. Several plau-
sible sources of bias exist. For instance, the impacts
on political participation would be overstated if more
politically active youth were more likely to join (or be
targeted by) the LRA, or if the less clever, confident,
or politically engaged abductees were more likely to
be killed. Although such selection is unknowable, we
can engage in a thought experiment, asking how in-
fluential such bias would have to be in order to ac-
count for the effects we observe. The Appendix de-
scribes the results of two forms of formal sensitivity
analysis. One analysis, displayed in Figure 1, models
unobserved selection into the LRA, and finds that
even an unobserved factor as influential as our pri-
mary determinants of abduction—age and location—
would reduce but not eliminate the impact of abduc-
tion on voting, leaving the general conclusion intact.
A second method estimates the degree of selective
nonreturn from abduction that would be required to
generate the impact we observe, and finds that rates
of turnout among nonreturned abductees would have
to be zero in order for the selection story to drive
the impacts we observe. Such scenarios are extremely
unlikely.
UNPACKING THE CAUSAL MECHANISM
Abduction by the LRA includes a multitude of war
experiences. To unpack the mechanism linking abduc-
tion to participation, we can look for relationships be-
tween participation and war experiences among for-
mer abductees. Table 4 displays regressions of a subset
of the participation and aggression indicators on war
experiences, including violent acts, the log of months
abducted, and indicators for whether the abductee car-
ried his own firearm, held a leadership position, passed
through a reception center, or later received NGO ser-
vices.
Two caveats are in order. First, unlike abduction,
war experiences may not be exogenous, meaning the
estimates could be biased. War experiences, violence
in particular, are also measured with error. Our in-
dices of violence record incidence, not frequency, and
so they systematically understate the number of acts
ever experienced. Abductees may also not admit their
most terrible experiences. Such systematic error would
increase standard errors and bias the violence coeffi-
cient toward zero, in which case the Table 4 estimates
should be considered a lower bound on the influence
of violence on participation.11
Results
Abductees who witnessed the most acts of violence
are the most likely to participate politically later in
life. Each additional act of violence witnessed is asso-
ciated with a 4.2 percentage point increase in the prob-
ability of voting and a 2.3 percentage point increase
in the probability of being a community mobilizer,
both significant at the 5% level at least (Columns 1
and 2). Are these effects large? The average abducted
youth reports 1.8 more acts of violence witnessed than
nonabducted youth, and so the coefficients in Table 4
11 Even if the bias were in the opposite direction, measurement
error is still unlikely to account for the correlation we observe. For
systematic measurement error to alter the conclusions, it must be as-
sociated with both abduction and the outcome of interest, not simply
abduction, and must be sufficiently large to change the conclusion.
Measurement error can be seen as an omitted variable, and thus con-
sidered in the sensitivity analysis in Figure 1. As with other omitted
variables, the amount of measurement error needed to change the
coefficient by an order of magnitude is implausibly large.
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0 .1 .2 .3
Influence of covariate on abduction
(Increase in R-squared)
Threshold for binomial covariate to reduce voting ATE by half
Influence of pre-war covariates on voting and abduction
Notes: The figure presents the results of the sensitivity analysis following Imbens (2003). Each + represents a prewar covariate,
plotted according to its additional explanatory power for treatment assignment (on the horizontal axis) and its explanatory power for the
outcome (vertical axis), which in this case is educational attainment. In essence, each axis measures the increase (or decrease) in the
R2 statistic from adding that covariate to the regression in question. The downward sloping curve represents the locus of points at which
any independent binomial covariate (observed or unobserved) would have sufficient association with both treatment and outcomes to
halve the ATE.
imply that violence witnessed is associated with a
7 percentage point increase in voting among abductees
(67% of abduction’s total impact, as seen in Table 3)
and a 4 percentage point increase in community mobi-
lization (119% of abduction’s impact).
We also see a somewhat significant relationship be-
tween violence witnessed and community group mem-
bership (Column 3); each act of violence witnessed
is associated with a 5.2 percentage point increase in
group membership, significant at the 10% level. We do
not, however, see a consistently significant relationship
between violence witnessed and aggression, whether
measured by physical fights, quarrels, or having ever
threatened others.
Abductees who experienced more family violence
are also more likely to be a community mobilizer.
Although the coefficient, .026, is large in absolute
terms, abductees and nonabductees report nearly
identical levels of family violence (Table 1). Thus,
such acts cannot be responsible for the impact of
abduction on political participation we observe in
Table 3.
Looking at other war experiences, none are as ro-
bustly and as consistently related to our measures of
political participation as is violence witnessed. Neither
the violence received, violence perpetrated, nor abduc-
tion length measures consistently with political partic-
ipation, community group membership, or aggression.
Having carried a firearm is not significantly related to
participation. Having held a leadership position in the
LRA, however, is associated with a large, 26.4 percent-
age point decrease in the probability of voting. There is
no substantive relationship between leadership and the
other measures of participation and aggression, how-
ever. Finally, former abductees who passed through a
reception center are somewhat more likely to vote but
not become community leaders.
Discussion
The analysis suggests that violence, especially violence
witnessed, is the main mechanism by which abduction
impacts participation: acts witnessed are strongly and
significantly associated with voting and mobilization,
acts witnessed differ between abducted and nonab-
ducted youth, and they can account for the bulk of
the impact of abduction on voting and mobilization.
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TABLE 4. Impact of War Experiences (Former Abductees Only)
















Violent acts witnessed .042 .023 .052 .001 .001 .015
[.019]∗∗ [.007]∗∗∗ [.026]∗ [.008] [.007] [.009]
Violent acts on family −.001 .026 .007 −.017 −.002 −.006
[.024] [.006]∗∗∗ [.031] [.009]∗ [.005] [.007]
Violent acts received .014 −.007 −.022 .007 0 −.002
[.019] [.009] [.021] [.012] [.004] [.006]
Violent acts perpetrated .014 −.003 .010 .014 .004 −.002
[.022] [.007] [.020] [.007]∗∗ [.005] [.004]
ln (Months abducted) −.033 −.011 −.032 −.005 −.015 −.002
[.018]∗ [.009] [.019] [.010] [.005]∗∗∗ [.005]
Carried own firearm .002 −.029 −.014 −.036 .072 .006
[.071] [.031] [.068] [.027] [.029]∗∗ [.036]
Leadership position −.264 .000 −.040 −.013 −.012 .106
[.080]∗∗∗ [.065] [.093] [.052] [.017] [.071]
Passed through
reception center
.157 −.024 −.068 .062 .046 −.024
[.083]∗ [.032] [.066] [.042] [.025]∗ [.047]
Received services −.119 .035 .098 −.020 −.029 .017
[.079] [.042] [.080] [.021] [.016]∗ [.020]
Observations 344 458 458 458 458 458
Controls not displayed:
Age (three orders) × × × × × ×
Location of birth
dummies
× × × × ×
Household traits in 1996 × × × × × ×
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression.
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by sampling location.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Violence against family is a key determinant ofpartici-
pation among abductees, but it cannot explain the gap
with nonabductees.
This pattern holds if we examine the relationship
between abduction and violence among all youth, in-
cluding the nonabducted. In a regression of voting and
community mobilization on violence, abduction, and
abduction length (Table 5), a youth who witnessed an
additional act of violence is 4.0 percentage points more
likely to vote and 1.4 percentage points more likely to
be a community mobilizer. Youth whose family experi-
ences an additional act of violence are also 1.9 percent-
age points more likely to be a community mobilizer.
As with abductees alone, youth who receive or per-
petrate greater violence do not appear to participate
any more or less. Violence is not significantly associ-
ated with any of our measures of aggression in the full
sample.
The remainder of the article explores the possible




What theories of political behavior could explain such
patterns? Although it is difficult to prove a particular
mechanism or channel is at work with the evidence at
hand, we can begin by eliminating some of the plausible
alternatives.
Mobilization by Elites or NGOs
Mobilization of youth by elites, parties, and NGOs is
common in Africa, and the mobilization of excom-
batants has been documented in instances such as
the 2007 election in Sierra Leone (Christensen and
Utas 2008). Such groups can mobilize participation
using social pressure or material goods (e.g., Green
and Gerber 2004; Shachar and Nalebuff 1999; Uhlaner
1989).
Mobilization is an unlikely account of abductee
participation in Uganda, however. First, no voter
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TABLE 5. Impact of War Experiences on Participation (All Respondents)














Violent acts witnessed .040 .014 .057 −.007 −.004 .008
[.023]∗ [.004]∗∗∗ [.022]∗∗ [.008] [.005] [.005]
Violent acts on family −.013 .019 .009 −.005 −.003 −.002
[.014] [.004]∗∗∗ [.020] [.007] [.005] [.004]
Violent acts received .024 −.009 −.047 .004 .008 −.003
[.023] [.008] [.015]∗∗∗ [.010] [.006] [.004]
Violent acts perpetrated −.006 −.002 .011 .013 .004 .000
[.025] [.005] [.021] [.007]∗ [.004] [.003]
Ever abducted .030 .033 .026 −.052 −.010 .015
[.052] [.015]∗∗ [.062] [.034] [.025] [.013]
Months abducted −.004 −.001 −.005 .000 .000 .000
[.002]∗∗ [.001] [.002]∗∗∗ [.001] [.000] [.000]
Observations 531 737 737 737 737 737
Controls not displayed:
Age (three orders) × × × × × ×
Location of birth
dummies
× × × × × ×
Household traits in × × × × × ×
1996
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by sampling location.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
mobilization efforts were observed by the author, lo-
cal research assistants, or the community leaders in-
terviewed. Indeed, at the time of the referendum, op-
position parties were not yet allowed to organize, and
turnout efforts are also outlawed on voting day. Second,
community mobilizer elections are held outside the
normal political cycle and are unrelated to party affilia-
tion. Community members typically nominate several
candidates, followed by a vote. None of the leaders in-
terviewed could recall interference from political elites
or discussion of political affiliations during these infor-
mal elections.
Third, the main indicators of interaction with
NGOs—having passed through a reception center or
received NGO services—are not strongly correlated
with voting and community participation (Table 4).
Passing through a reception center is associated with
higher rates of voting (significant at only the 10%
level), but the result is quite fragile to the specifica-
tion employed (unlike our other results), and we were
more concerned that NGO interaction would lead to
community leadership positions rather than voter mo-
bilization (of which there was none). If NGOs mobi-
lized former abductees, they did not do so using their
registries.
Finally, participation is associated with a relatively
unobservable trait—violence witnessed—and not with
a more easily observed marker of abduction, such as
abduction itself or length of abduction. It is difficult to
believe that youth were mobilized on the basis of such
a hidden trait.
Differential Costs
Simple rational theories of participation suggest that
it is decreasing in shoe leather and opportunity costs
(Feddersen 2004; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). If these
costs are lower among abductees, or the recipients
of violence, it might account for the higher partic-
ipation we observe. Proxies for higher shoe leather
costs include indicators for not living in one’s district
of origin—for instance, having Migrated to a town or
Migrated out of district. Bad health could also im-
pede participation, measured using an Injury indica-
tor and an indicator for being in the Top quartile of
emotional distress proxy. Finally, opportunity cost is
proxied by an Asset index, Days employed, and Gross
earnings.
Logically, any factor responsible for the patterns
we observe must meet three conditions: (1) it must
differ between abducted and nonabducted youth, (2)
it must be correlated with voting and mobilization,
and (3) it should be associated with violence wit-
nessed. Table 6 assesses the explanatory power of each
proxy, calculating the difference between abductees
and nonabductees and the correlation with three par-
ticipation variables. Only one proxy, serious injuries,
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TABLE 6. Relative Explanatory Power of the Correlates of Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Voted in 2005
Impact of Referendum Community Mobilizer
Abduction
(ATE)† Correlation % of ATE‡ Correlation % of ATE‡
Currently lives in town −.033 .014 0% −.048 5%
[.038] [.050] [.023]∗∗
Currently lives outside home district .005 −.176 −1% .040 1%
[.026] [.085]∗∗ [.033]
Serious injury .093 −.037 −3% −.042 −11%
[.022]∗∗∗ [.039] [.021]∗
Top quartile of emotional distress .102 −.034 −3% .015 5%
[.042]∗∗ [.056] [.015]
Asset index −.279 −.001 0% −.002 2%
[.064]∗∗∗ [.037] [.010]
Days employed in past four weeks 1.24 .003 3% .002 7%
[.791] [.003] [.001]∗∗
Gross cash earnings in past 4 weeks (USD) −5891 .000 0% .000 0%
[5689] [.000]∗∗ [.000]
Volunteer .012 .212 2% .035 1%
[.012] [.109]∗ [.048]
Bottom quartile of pro-social distribution −.069 −.002 0% −.007 1%
[.045] [.058] [.032]
Index of 17 forms of social support −.147 .001 0% .003 −1%
[.150] [.011] [.003]
Indicator for functional literacy −.121 .007 −1% −.012 4%
[.038]∗∗∗ [.052] [.033]
Radio ownership −.015 −.053 1% −.010 0%
[.032] [.062] [.029]
Educational attainment in years −.702 −.002 1% .000 0%
[.181]∗∗∗ [.009] [.003]
Observations 741 533 741
Additional controls (not displayed)
Age (three orders) × × ×
Location of birth dummies × × ×
Household traits in 1996 × × ×
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by sampling location.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Figures in bold represent correlates that exhibit a statistically significant ATE (at the 5% level) in Column 1 and a
statistically significant relationship with the measure of participation (either Columns 2 or 4).
†Each item in Column 1 is a separate regression. Each ATE is calculated as the coefficient on an abduction indicator
variable in an ordinary least squares regression of the dependent variable on abduction and controls (age and location
dummies, age/location interactions, and pretreatment individual and household characteristics). Weights include inverse
sampling probabilities and inverse attrition probabilities.
‡Calculated as the ATE in Column 1 multiplied by the coefficient in Column 2, divided by the relevant ATE in Table 3.
meets the criteria, albeit the sign is in the “wrong”
direction: abductees are more likely to be injured,
but injured youth are less likely to be mobilizers.
Hence, abductees’ heightened leadership comes de-
spite their costly injuries, not because of them. None
of the other proxies for shoe leather and opportunity
costs appear influential.
Altered Social Preferences
Other participation theorists have proposed that in-
dividuals have altruistic preferences and take into ac-
count the benefit of their actions to others (e.g., Edlin,
Gelman, and Kaplan 2007; Feddersen and Sandroni
2002; Harsanyi 1977, 1992). Military conditioning, or
violent or near-death experiences, could in principle al-
ter such preferences and increase participation among
abductees. If so, we should observe that individuals who
participate politically also make other social contribu-
tions, such as public goods management (e.g., school
and water groups) or being a volunteer. We might
also expect to observe higher levels of prosocial be-
havior, such as respectfulness and cooperation. The
survey measures both Prosocial behavior and an Index
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of social support received. According to the estimates in
Table 6, abductees do not exhibit greater social contri-
butions or group participation, and prosocial behavior
and social support are actually lower. We see no evi-
dence of a general shifts in altruism.
Augmented Information
Finally, a set of theories proposes that informed vot-
ers are more likely to participate (e.g., Feddersen and
Pesendorfer 1999). Information is proxied by indica-
tors for Functional literacy, Radio ownership, and Edu-
cational attainment, all included in Table 6. Abductees,
however, are considerably less (not more) likely to
be literate, educated, or own a radio. Moreover, none
of these traits are closely associated with voting, sug-
gesting that formal education and information are not
the channel of impact. Naturally, this analysis does not
preclude the influence of other types of information or
experience. War and abduction are undoubtedly learn-
ing experiences that may transform the perceived costs
and benefits of participation. But the simple education–
voting correlation seen in the United States is not repli-
cated here.
WHAT THE ABDUCTEES SAY
To better understand the role of abduction and vio-
lence in political participation, we turn to interviews
with former abductees, leaders, social workers, and
political party operators. As discussed previously, the
qualitative evidence is limited in scope. Even so, several
patterns emerged from the semistructured interviews.
First, several abducted youth described, after return,
a sense of power over their lives and events. Abductees
commonly witnessed terrible acts and even came close
to death themselves. One youth emphasized that af-
ter such experiences, he felt he could face anything
in civilian life. Another spoke of “making up for lost
time”, and a third spoke of finding purpose after the
violence—a sense he was “chosen”.12
The decision to escape from the LRA in partic-
ular was framed in language of self-determination
and control. Several youth described a turning point
where the “scales fell from their eyes”, whereupon
they realized that the propaganda fed to them by the
rebel leadership—the righteousness of violence, or the
seizure of the government—was false.13 In some cases,
this realization was associated with witnessing or expe-
riencing a terrible and seemingly senseless act of vio-
lence. In a crucial act of self-determination, the youth
took back control of their lives and decided to run away.
Interviews with elders and other community leaders
yielded similar sentiments. According to a reception
center social worker, who also worked as an election
poll supervisor during the previous two elections, for-
merly abducted youth “feel like they can take control
12 Author’s interview with Abductee 4 (17 June 2007), Abductee 7
(19 June 2007), and Abductee 19 (22 June 2007).
13 Author’s interview with Abductee 7 (19 June 2007), Abductee 10
(20 June 2007), and Abductee 15 (21 June 2007).
of their lives,” and “are subjected to hardship where. . .
they mature very fast.”14 Asked their opinion of for-
merly abducted youth, elders and leaders from several
different villages explained that abduction (and vio-
lence in particular) is an experience that “matured” ab-
ducted youth and made them “more serious.”15 These
same terms are ones commonly used in Acholi culture
to describe the difference between a boy and a man.
The experience of violence was thus associated with
local processes of maturation.
Not all abducted youth expressed an increased sense
of control. The majority of youth (abducted or not)
took pains to highlight their idleness, helplessness, and
despair. At the time of the field work, respondents (like
the entire district rural population) had been displaced
from their homes and livelihoods for at least four years.
Few places on Earth are poorer or more desperate.
Abductee accounts of marginal gains in control and
outlook must be considered against this backdrop of
misery.16
A second rationale for abductees’ leadership is their
comfort with public speaking and airing their opinion
to others. Acholi leaders commonly attributed their
own role in the community, and their nomination to
elected positions, to such confidence and skills. Like-
wise, one elder suggested that war trauma gave ab-
ducted youth “courage to speak their minds,” whereas
a poll and social worker emphasized that former ab-
ductees “comfortably speak their views in a group of
people or a crowd.”17 The informants attributed these
behaviors to the training and experience in the LRA, as
well as the confidence borne of experience as a fighter.
Such accounts suggest a change in both perspective
and ability. That is, in addition to a change in self-
regard, abductees may have acquired leadership skills
in the bush, and so they lead at home because they are
more able (rather than simply more optimistic or confi-
dent). The evidence for skills and experience, however,
is weak. First, we do not observe a strong correlation
between political participation and leadership roles in
the LRA. If anything, leadership is associated with
less participation, at least in the form of voter turnout
(Table 4). Second, there is little systematic relation-
ship between abduction length (another reasonable
proxy for experience) and political engagement. Third,
if skills are the relevant channel, the link to violence
witnessed is not clear. A change in personal goals, per-
spective, or self-regard, although impossible to prove,
is more consistent with the patterns we observe.
14 Author’s interview with Poll worker 1 (20 June 2007).
15 Author’s interview with Leader 2 (17 June 2007), Leader 4 (19
June 2007), and Leader 5 (20 June 2007).
16 Also, although abduction is associated with greater control over
the present and future, an absence of past control is associated with
resilience. Abductees commonly and successfully coped with trau-
matic memories by attributing their ordeals to “God’s will”, sug-
gesting that they were not responsible for their acts. An absence of
self-blame was strongly associated with psychological resilience, as
was an ability to “forget” bad experiences and focus on the future
(Annan et al. 2008).
17 Author’s interview with Leader 1 (17 June 2007), and Poll worker
2 (22 June 2007).
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Theoretical Interpretations
There are at least three plausible interpretations of the
interview accounts. The first draws on a body of psycho-
logical research the potential for growth after traumatic
experiences. Traditionally, psychologists have focused
on the damaging effects of violent trauma (as well as
the widespread resilience to such experiences).18 Yet,
in case after case of traumatic experience—including
fatal diseases, rape, assault, house fires, plane crashes,
war violence, and loss of a loved one—reports of “post-
traumatic growth” experiences consistently outnumber
reports of psychiatric disorders (Tedeschi and Calhoun
2004).
Indeed, a growing body of case evidence suggests
that there are five major domains of personal growth af-
ter traumatic experiences: a greater appreciation of life
and changed sense of priorities; warmer, more intimate
relationships with others; a greater sense of personal
strength; recognition of new possibilities or paths for
one’s life; and spiritual development (e.g., Emmons,
Colby, and Kaiser 1998; Haidt 2006; Nolen-Hoeksema
and Davis 2002; Tedeschi and Calhoun 1996).
A small number of these studies look specifically at
the victims of war violence, finding self-reported levels
of personal growth among Yugoslav refugees (Powell
et al. 2003), U.S. World War II veterans (Elder and
Clipp 1989), U.S. prisoners of war in Vietnam (Sledge,
Boydstun, and Rabe 1980), and Israeli adolescents ex-
posed to terror incidents (Laufer and Solomon 2006).
In most cases, the degree of growth is positively associ-
ated with the harshness of the violence. These studies
argue that surviving a traumatic event unleashes sev-
eral processes: it reveals hidden abilities and changes
one’s self-concept, it initiates a personal evaluation and
shifts goals and priorities, and it shatters previous belief
systems and leads to a struggle to make meaning from
the experience.
These studies do not, however, distinguish between
different forms of victimization—whether violence wit-
nessed, received, or on the family. Accounts of post-
traumatic growth also have several weaknesses: they
are typically self-reported, difficult to verify, and must
be taken at face value (Tennen and Affleck 1998). Com-
parison groups are also seldom employed. The parallel
to abductees’ political accounts is nonetheless striking.
A second possible interpretation come from “ex-
pressive” theories of participation, where individuals
are presumed to value the act of political expression
itself (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1976; Riker and Ordeshook
1968). The origin of such preferences, and the reasons
for variation across people and time, are poorly under-
stood. If posttraumatic growth theorists are correct,
however, the reordering of personal goals and priori-
ties after witnessing a traumatic event could alter one’s
information set, expectations, or tastes for participa-
tion in proportion to the trauma received. Like theories
18 Studies commonly find that only a minority of victims develop
long-term emotional distress and other disorders (e.g., Elder and
Clipp 1989; King et al. 1998; Luthar, Cicchetti, and Becker 2000;
Masten 2001).
of posttraumatic growth, however, expressive prefer-
ences (and changes) are difficult to test or disprove.
Also, the specific link to violence witnessed remains a
puzzle.
Finally, traumatic events may not simply change per-
ceptions, but actually provide concrete information and
experience. Former abductees may be better informed
of the costs of conflict than their peers. They have also
traveled widely and met people of different countries
and cultures. They have learned to fight and work
as a group toward common goals, and have proven
their mettle in escaping from the rebel group. Such
experience may not only change the calculus of par-
ticipation, but also the personal returns to collective
action. Although the potential relationship between
these abilities and violence received is not clear, we
cannot dismiss the possibility of a link.
CONCLUSION
Survey evidence from Uganda suggests that the victims
of violence are just as likely as their peers to participate
socially and behave aggressively. They are considerably
more likely, however, to vote and lead in their commu-
nities.
This link from violent trauma to increased par-
ticipation has been observed elsewhere after war.
Bellows and Miguel (2008) observe similar patterns in
Sierra Leone: civilians whose household experienced
a killing, maiming, or displacement are more likely
to attend community meetings; more likely to join
political groups; and more likely to vote than peers.
Similarly, Shewfelt (2009) interviews households in
postconflict Aceh, Indonesia, and finds a strong pos-
itive correlation between an index of 43 traumatic
events and political participation (e.g., political party
membership) and other social groups (e.g., cultural,
recreational, religious, and service groups). Finally,
Carmil and Breznitz (1990) survey Jewish Holocaust
survivors alongside a control group of their Israeli
peers and find that survivors support more centrist
political parties and express a greater belief in God
and in a better future. Thus, the link we observe in
Uganda could be part of a more general phenomenon
linking trauma to activation.
It is a link, however, that is difficult to decipher. Sev-
eral obvious channels of impact, such as mobilization
of the disaffected, find little support. Meanwhile, inter-
views with the youth yield narratives of newfound self-
control, confidence, and skills. Such accounts, although
far from conclusive, nonetheless mesh with psycholog-
ical theories of posttraumatic growth and political evi-
dence on expressive voting. The evidence thus focuses
attention on a relatively unexplored area of study: the
psychological foundations of political engagement, the
sources of interpersonal variation, and the effects of
experience, particularly traumatic experiences, on po-
litical attitudes and participation.
Such traumatic experiences are tragically common.
Violence is endemic in developing countries. Among
excombatants, in particular, forced recruitment and
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the controlled use of violence is at least as common
in fighting forces as the use of voluntary participation
and rewards (Beber and Blattman 2008; Humphreys
and Weinstein 2008; Weinstein 2007). The LRA, which
is frequently mischaracterized as an irrational and bar-
baric rebel group, is far from unique in this regard.19
Hence, these findings may have (hopeful) implications
for millions of fighters in dozens of wartorn countries,
especially in Africa. To the extent that positive po-
litical engagement also springs from violence against
civilians, many more millions may be affected in the
same way.
There are important limits, however, on this article’s
results. First, the political outcomes measured in the
survey are few in number, so we should take caution in
generalizing the findings to political participation more
broadly. The determinants of other forms of political
engagement could differ. Second, the results arise from
data on male Ugandan youth, and may not apply to
females or older adults, or other regions. Even so, the
similarity between the Ugandan results and those from
refugees and victims of war violence in other countries
suggests some degree of external validity. Generaliza-
tion of the results awaits more data collection in more
situations of violence and conflict.
Finally, a more important question remains unan-
swered: why in Uganda did violence lead to peaceful
and productive rather than contentious participation?
The answer is undoubtedly societally and institution-
ally specific. Several aspects of Ugandan institutions
and culture may have led to the generally positive
political engagement we see: a functioning, relatively
democratic government at the national and local level,
vigorous and open local political systems that are in-
clusive of youth, and a society that generally welcomed
former abductees back into the community. In the ab-
sence of any of these conditions, posttraumatic par-
ticipation may have been muted or even destructive.
Studies of young excombatants in Sierra Leone and
Liberia, for instance, are considerably less optimistic
about youths’ positive political engagement, and even
find evidence of violent electoral participation (Bøås
and Hatløy 2006; Christensen and Utas 2008; Utas
2003). There are few more important questions in poli-
tics about who works peacefully within the system, who
turns to violence, and why.
Despite these caveats, this article’s findings suggest
some important general lessons. If nothing else, we
have seen that the proclivity for participation varies
among individuals, they are malleable, and they can be
shaped in systematic and predictable ways. Violence
and hardship may be particularly influential, and in an
unexpected direction, a positive one. In this conclusion,
we may have been preceded by Shakespeare: “Sweet
are the uses of adversity,” he wrote, “Which like the
19 Anthropologists and political scientists that study the LRA take
a different view, finding the guerrilla force to be much more con-
ventional and strategic in its use of violence and spirituality than
is represented by the Ugandan government and Western media
(e.g., see Allen and Vlassenroot 2008; Lamwaka 2002; Lucima 2002;
Finnström 2008a, 2008b; Blattman and Annan 2008; Branch 2008;
Mwenda 2008; Schomerus 2008; Titeca 2008).
toad, ugly and venomous/Wears yet a precious jewel in
his head.”20
APPENDIX: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
This appendix explores the sensitivity of the impacts of ab-
duction (estimated in Table 3) to violations of some of the fun-
damental identification conditions, and illustrates that only
under extreme and unlikely circumstances could the results
we observe be generated by unobserved selection into the
armed group, or selective attrition.
First, we can employ a method of sensitivity analysis based
on Imbens (2003) that explicitly models a degree of unob-
served selection into the armed group. Figure 1 plots each of
the observed prewar control variables on two axes: a vertical
axis that indicates the increase in explained variation (i.e.,
the increase in the R2 statistic) that comes from adding the
control to a regression of voting on all other controls, and a
horizontal axis that indicates the influence of each control
in explaining variation in abduction. Influence in both is
a prerequisite for inducing a selection effect. As expected,
only the year and location of birth indicators substantially
influence both abduction and voting.
We can also engage in a thought experiment: model a
hypothetical unobserved variable U, and ask how influential
it would need to be to reduce the impact on voting by a
substantial amount. In essence, this U represents any source
of self-selection, or selection on the part of the LRA, which
we fear may lead to bias in the result. The question is then
how much bias, relative to the observed covariates, would be
enough to change out conclusions?
The downward sloping curve in Figure 1 represents all the
combinations of (a) correlation between U and abduction,
and (b) correlation between U and voting, that would be suf-
ficient to halve the observed impact of abduction on voting.21
The curve is therefore a threshold, beyond which our hypo-
thetical U is influential enough to significantly reduce our
result (although, we should note, still leave the direction and
general magnitude of the impact intact). Only our age and
location indicators exceed the threshold, implying that our
hypothetical unobservable would need to be as influential
as the primary determinants of abduction just to halve the
observed treatment effect.
Another form of sensitivity analysis allows us to consider
the potential effects of selective attrition. One option would
be to follow Manski (1990) or Lee (2005) and estimate non-
parametric bounds on the impact of abduction. Doing so
leaves the general conclusions relatively unchanged, how-
ever, because attrition levels are nearly identical in the two
groups. It is attrition patterns that differ. In particular, the
abducted are uniquely likely not to return from abduction
(almost all of whom can be presumed perished), whereas
the nonabducted are more likely to have otherwise died, or
migrated, and remain unfound.
We can perform a second thought experiment to consider
whether the treatment effects we observe could be accounted
for by different forms of selective attrition. For instance,
what if voter turnout among nonabductees (40%) is the
“true” level of turnout among all youth, observed or not?
What degree of selective return from abduction would be re-
quired to lead us to erroneously observe 51% turnout among
former abductees? The answer is none: rates of voter turnout
20 As You Like It, II.i.12–14, quoted in Haidt (2006).
21 The unobservable in question is modeled as a binomial variable
independent of all other covariates that is assumed to have a logistic
conditional distribution with both voting and abduction.
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among unreturned abductees would have to be zero in order
for there to be no difference in turnout between abducted
and nonabducted youth.22 A hypothetical turnout of 25%
among unreturned abductees, meanwhile, would be sufficient
to halve the estimated impact of abduction on voting, from 11
percentage points to 5.5. Even under such extreme assump-
tions, the general direction, magnitude, and significance of
the impacts would not change.
REFERENCES
Allen, Tim. 2005. “War and Justice in Northern Uganda: An Assess-
ment of the International Criminal Court’s Intervention.” London:
Crisis States Research Centre, Development Studies Institute,
London School of Economics.
Allen, Tim, and Koen Vlassenroot. 2008. “Introduction.” In The
Lord’s Resistance Army: War, Peace and Reconciliation in Northern
Uganda, eds. Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot. London School of
Economics and Political Science. Typescript.
Annan, Jeannie, Christopher Blattman, and Roger Horton. 2006.
“The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern Uganda:
Findings from the Survey of War Affected Youth.” Kampala,
Uganda: UNICEF.
Annan, Jeannie, Moriah Brier, and Filder Aryemo. 2008. “From
‘Rebel’ to ‘Returnee’: Daily Life and Reintegration for Youth in
Northern Uganda.” Yale University. Unpublished working paper.
Baines, Erin. 2005. “Restoring Relationships in Acholi-Land: Tra-
ditional Approaches to Justice and Reintegration.” Vancouver,
Canada: Liu Institute.
BBC. 2007. “Child Soldiers ‘Are a Time Bomb’.” BBC News, Febru-
ary 5.
Beber, Bernd, and Christopher Blattman. 2008. “The Industrial Or-
ganization of Rebellion: The Logic of Forced Labor and Child
Soldiering.” Yale University Unpublished working paper.
Behrend, Heike. 1999. Alice Lakwena & Holy Spirits: War In North-
ern Uganda 1985–97. Columbus: Ohio University Press.
Bellows, John, and Edward Miguel. 2006. “War and Institutions: New
Evidence from Sierra Leone.” American Economic Association,
Papers and Proceedings 96 (2): 394–9.
Bellows, John, and Edward Miguel. 2008. “War and Local Collective
Action in Sierra Leone.” Berkeley: UC Berkeley.
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